As the second-largest arms importer in sub-Saharan Africa according to SIPRI, Senegal is accelerating the modernization of its armed forces and inaugurating its first military vehicle assembly plant. Facing threats from the Sahel, the protection of offshore hydrocarbons, and the diversification of suppliers, Dakar is betting on building its own defense sovereignty.

A strategic turning point in West Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing a reconfiguration of its arms flows. According to data published in March 2025 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), arms imports in this region increased by 13% between the periods 2016-2020 and 2021-2025, even as the African continent as a whole saw a 41% decrease (SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024 , March 2025). At the heart of this shift, Senegal now ranks second among arms importers in sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for 8.8% of regional imports. This positioning, far from being insignificant, reflects a doctrinal and industrial transformation that warrants careful examination.

A secure environment that dictates the defense effort

Senegal has long been perceived in West African security literature as an island of institutional stability. This reputation, based on a democratic tradition rarely challenged since 1960, should not, however, obscure the progressive deterioration of the regional security environment. The Sahel region, which borders Senegal to the north and east, has been plagued for over a decade by insurgent movements to which neither Mali, Burkina Faso, nor Niger has been able to provide a lasting response. France's withdrawal from Mali in 2022, followed by its withdrawal from Burkina Faso and Niger in 2023, has left an operational vacuum that these countries are attempting to fill through alternative partnerships with Russia and Turkey, without the results on the ground being commensurate with the urgency of the situation.

Senegal is not facing an insurgency on its territory of the scale affecting its neighbors. The rebellion in Casamance, one of the oldest on the continent, has seen its intensity decrease considerably over the last decade. However, porous borders, the circulation of small arms, and the geographic expansion of armed groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the Sahel make the threat tangible. In 2023, the former Chief of Staff of the Senegalese Armed Forces, General Mbaye Cissé, reiterated the ambition to " work continuously towards consolidating an army that is ready for deployment through its organization and its ability to anticipate, and responsive through its flexibility and its capacity to contain both internal and external threats."   and above all, resilient to all forms of adversity that tend to undermine its cohesion ."

In addition to this land-based threat, there is an increasingly crucial maritime dimension. The discovery and exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits off the coast of Senegal, notably the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) gas field and the Sangomar oil field, has made securing maritime approaches a top strategic priority. Protecting these infrastructures against piracy, the theft of fisheries resources, and all forms of sabotage requires naval capabilities that Senegal did not possess in the recent past.

Acquisitions that outline a new architecture of forces

Senegal's arms buildup stands out from that of its neighbors due to its apparent coherence. While Mali is accumulating Russian deliveries in a logic of survival for the military regime, and Nigeria is multiplying suppliers to respond to threats scattered across multiple fronts, Dakar seems to be building a military apparatus structured around three pillars: land mobility, maritime surveillance and intervention, and air capability.

On the ground, Senegal has acquired Puma M36 armored personnel carriers, manufactured by the South African company OTT Technologies. These armored vehicles, designed to withstand mines and improvised explosive devices, directly address lessons learned from the Sahel conflicts, where military convoys are regularly ambushed.

On the naval front, the commissioning of three offshore patrol vessels, the Walo , the Niani , and the Cayor , marked a significant leap forward. These ships, built by the French shipyard Piriou, allow the Senegalese navy to patrol its exclusive economic zone with a range and endurance that its former coastal patrol boats could not provide.

The defense agreement concluded in 2025 with the Turkish supplier, ICC Yapi Yatirim , for a reported amount of 208 billion CFA francs (approximately 317 million euros), is undoubtedly the most significant acquisition in terms of financial volume. This agreement aims to strengthen the operational capacity of the Senegalese armed forces in several areas (Air Force, Navy, and Directorate of Equipment [heavy logistics]). Turkey, which in just a few years has become a major player in the sub-Saharan African arms market with an 11% market share according to SIPRI, has been able to offer equipment at prices lower than those of traditional Western suppliers, along with technology transfer and industrial offsets that the United States or France do not always offer.

Diamniadio: the birth of a national defense industry

Perhaps the most remarkable element of Senegal's strategy lies not in the arms imports themselves, but in the stated intention to build a national defense industrial base. The inauguration of a military vehicle assembly plant in Diamniadio, a new city located about thirty kilometers from Dakar, represents a new development in the West African defense landscape.

This choice is part of a broader trend than just defense economics specialists.   These trends have been observed across the continent since the beginning of the decade. Several African countries are seeking to reduce their dependence on imports by developing local capabilities, however modest they may initially be. South Africa remains the most successful example: Denel produces Umkhonto missiles, radars, and Rooikat armored vehicles, while Paramount Group assembles AHRLAC helicopters and Mbombe mine-resistant vehicles, giving the country an estimated 70% self-sufficiency in munitions and light armored vehicles. In Nigeria, the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) manufactures Beretta AR70/90 rifles under license, munitions, and armored vehicles, with a stated objective of 30% local production by 2030, despite recurring delays. Ethiopia is taking a different approach, leveraging the technical division of Ethiopian Airlines, certified by the FAA and EASA, to maintain military aircraft such as the MiG-29 and Su-27, while also developing drone assembly projects. In North Africa, Egypt produces T-90 tanks and AW-149 helicopters under license, Morocco assembles drones in cooperation with the Elbit and Tata groups, and Algeria manufactures munitions and light vehicles. These initiatives, although often limited to assembly and munitions production, with approximately 70% of components still imported, demonstrate a shared desire to reduce dependence on external suppliers in the face of both budgetary and geopolitical constraints. These countries have led the way. Senegal, by launching its own assembly program, is pragmatically joining this movement.

The Diamniadio plant is part of the larger Diamniadio urban development project, designed as an industrial and technological hub. The choice of this site was not accidental: it connects defense production to the new hub's logistical infrastructure while locating sensitive facilities away from the Cap-Vert peninsula, where Dakar's high urban density makes any large-scale industrial development difficult. Local assembly of military vehicles, even using imported components, reduces long-term acquisition costs, creates skilled jobs, allows for control over maintenance and repairs, and fosters the gradual acquisition of expertise transferable to other areas of the mechanical engineering industry.

However, the limitations of this ambition must be acknowledged. No country can build a viable defense industry from scratch . South Africa's own experience, the most advanced on the continent, demonstrates that the economic viability of national arms industries depends on regular government contracts, export markets, and a subcontractor ecosystem that Senegal does not yet possess. The project's success will hinge on the government's ability to maintain sustained budgetary efforts and forge strategic industrial partnerships with foreign entities willing to transfer technology.

Senegal's role in the geopolitics of arms transfers

Senegal's rise as an arms importer must be understood in light of the reshaping of defense partnerships on the continent. SIPRI data for the period 2021-2025 reveals that China has become the leading arms supplier to sub-Saharan Africa with a 22% market share, followed by Russia at 12% and Turkey at 11%. France, long the primary supplier for Francophone countries, is seeing its influence wane, not only in Sahelian states that have severed their military cooperation agreements, but also in those, like Senegal, that are diversifying their sources of supply without severing ties with Paris.

Senegal has adopted what could be described as a controlled multi-alignment strategy . It maintains defense relations with France, which retains a residual military influence in Dakar. It purchases patrol boats from a French shipyard, but it also turns to South Africa for armored vehicles and to Turkey for a major defense agreement. It does not close the door to any supplier capable of meeting its operational needs under acceptable conditions. This diversification is not ideological; it is functional. It allows Senegal to avoid dependence on a single supplier and to foster competition among bids to obtain the best financial and technological terms.

This positioning distinguishes, for example, Senegal from Mali. Bamako shifted into a relationship of almost exclusive dependence on Russia after the break with France and the departure of MINUSMA. Mali, the third-largest arms importer in sub-Saharan Africa with approximately 8% of the regional market share, has received Turkish Sukhoi Su-25 attack aircraft, Mi-35M helicopters, T-72 tanks, and Bayraktar TB2 drones. However, this accumulation of equipment is not, at this stage, accompanied by an industrial project comparable to that of Senegal. The contrast is striking: on the one hand, a country that imports to survive; on the other, a country that imports to build.

The risks of accelerated militarization

It would be incomplete to examine Senegal's military buildup without highlighting the risks. The increase in defense spending, in a country where the needs for education, health, and infrastructure remain considerable, raises the question of budgetary trade-offs. Senegal's defense budget has increased significantly in recent years, while the 208 billion CFA franc (approximately 317 million euros) agreement with Turkey represents a heavy financial commitment for an economy whose GDP was estimated at 18,619.5 billion CFA francs in 2023 (ANSD, 2025).

Furthermore, the increase in arms imports to sub-Saharan Africa as a whole fuels a phenomenon known as the regional security dilemma : each state, by strengthening its military capabilities in response to perceived threats, encourages its neighbors to do the same, thereby increasing collective insecurity rather than reducing it. SIPRI itself notes that monitoring arms transfers to active conflict zones remains difficult, as many military agreements remain opaque.

The case of Sudan illustrates the potential for abuse. The conflict that erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces was fueled by arms deliveries from multiple suppliers, including Belarus, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. This uncontrolled proliferation demonstrates that increased arms flows, in the absence of control and transparency mechanisms, can transform latent tensions into open warfare.

A bet on the future

Senegal is not Sudan. Its institutional tradition, its democratic transitions, and the subordination of the army to civilian power constitute safeguards that many of its neighbors lack. Strengthening Senegal's military capabilities, if conducted rigorously and transparently, can contribute to regional stability rather than destabilize it.

Dakar's gamble rests on a clear strategic calculation: faced with a Sahel in crisis, offshore natural resources that must be protected, and intensifying competition between external powers on the continent, Senegal has chosen not to remain defenseless. With the Diamniadio factory, it has also chosen not to be a mere consumer of weapons manufactured elsewhere. This dual ambition, both operational and industrial, makes Senegal a unique case study in West Africa. Its success or failure will have repercussions far beyond its borders.

Amadou Moctar Ann, Lecturer-Researcher at BEM and Dakar Sciences Po, Researcher at the Doctoral School of Legal, Political, Economic and Management Sciences at Cheikh Anta Diop University