Long presented as an alternative to Western powers, China is now establishing itself as the main mining player in Africa. But as its footprint expands, promises of development are giving way to increasingly pressing questions about the true nature of this relationship.

In several countries, Chinese companies control strategic deposits essential to the global energy transition. In the DRC, cobalt, indispensable for electric batteries, has become a major lever of Chinese influence. In about fifteen years, Beijing has taken control of the majority of industrial mines, thus locking down access to a key resource.

The Sicomines contract is a telling example. Presented as a balanced exchange of infrastructure and minerals, it primarily generated a colossal debt and few tangible benefits for the Congolese population. This imbalance has prompted the current authorities to initiate renegotiations, implicitly acknowledging the limitations of the model.

In Guinea, the situation is hardly different. As China's leading supplier of bauxite, the country sees its resources leave the territory in their raw state, without significant local industrialization. The economic benefits remain concentrated, while the environmental and social costs are borne by the population.

In Ghana, the involvement of Chinese nationals in illegal gold mining has triggered a major environmental crisis. Polluted rivers, destroyed farmland, diplomatic tensions: the galamsey phenomenon illustrates the excesses of poorly regulated mining.

Beyond the figures, the question of economic sovereignty is at stake. Do African states still have any real room for maneuver in the face of a partner that has become indispensable? While some countries are trying to impose local processing requirements or rebalance contracts, financial and commercial dependence complicates any fundamental reassessment.