Qui choisit vraiment le Secrétaire général de l’ONU ?
With each election cycle for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the same impression prevails: that of an international competition where the best candidates face off on equal footing, believing in a democratic election by the votes of the United Nations General Assembly. However, this perception is largely misleading. In reality, the history of the UN shows that this strategic position defies the traditional logic of merit, democracy, or popularity.
The recent commotion surrounding a possible candidacy of the former President of Senegal, His Excellency Macky Sall, is an illustration of this. Widely discussed in Senegal and Africa, it deserves to be placed within the true context of the selection process for the position: a profoundly geostrategic and geopolitical process, dominated by the balance of power between the major powers of the UN Security Council: the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom.
An election… under the control and influence of the major powers: officially, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the United Nations Security Council. But in reality, everything is decided within this body, and more specifically among its five permanent members.
Their power is decisive: each has a veto. In other words, a single country can eliminate any candidate, even one widely supported by the other states. Therefore, the decisive criterion is the absence of a veto, not the superiority of the candidate's profile. Geopolitical and geostrategic impasses produce sometimes unexpected compromise candidates and define the profile of the one generally accepted by all: the most moderate, least divisive, and possessing strong international experience without any demonstrated political bias.
Based on the respective geostrategic and geopolitical discourses, behaviors, and decision-making cultures of the major powers in the Security Council, it can be seen that the United States has historically exercised decisive vetoes, while Russia and China favor non-interventionist profiles, and European powers support multilateral profiles.
All of this radically transforms the selection process. It's not about choosing the best candidate, but about avoiding the one who causes trouble. The process is therefore less a competition than a gradual filtering, at the end of which emerges a candidate acceptable to all—without necessarily generating enthusiasm. It's about choosing a secretary, not a leader of world political leaders (which would be unacceptable to at least one of them, hence a veto)!
Thus, a highly politicized candidacy has little chance of success. Early public support must be measured, favoring discreet channels. Real influence is exerted upstream, through discreetly targeted diplomatic alliances.
Let's return to the story which speaks for itself: since 1946, the Secretaries-General of the UN perfectly illustrate the logic explained.
The first UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie (Norway, 1946–1952), was chosen in the context of the organization's inception, without any real structured competition. His successor, Dag Hammarskjöld (Sweden, 1953–1961), remains one of the most striking examples: virtually unknown at the time of his appointment, he emerged as a compromise candidate after deadlocks among the major powers, to the detriment of much more famous figures like Lester B. Pearson. After his sudden death, U. Thant (Burma/Myanmar, 1961–1971) was chosen for his neutrality in the context of the Cold War. The same logic prevailed for Kurt Waldheim (Austria, 1972–1981), then Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Peru, 1982–1991), the latter being appointed after multiple rounds of deadlock among more prominent candidates. From what follows, it is worth noting that since 1981, the United States has not held a UN Secretary-General position. In the 1990s, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt, 1992–1996) marked a turning point: despite a record considered solid, he was prevented from obtaining a second term due to a US veto. This episode confirmed a fundamental principle: even in office, a Secretary-General remains dependent on the major powers. His successor, Kofi Annan (Ghana, 1997–2006), was himself a compromise choice following this deadlock. A discreet and consensus-building UN official, he was preferred to more politically engaged African figures like Amara Essy. So, Africa held the position from 1992 to 2006. More recently, Ban Ki-moon (South Korea, 2007–2016), a technocrat, won against the very media-savvy Shashi Tharoor, before António Guterres (Portugal, since 2017) prevailed against several leading candidates, including Irina Bokova and Kristalina Georgieva.
One constant is the process of elimination: from this history, spanning nearly 80 years, a strong pattern emerges, namely that the Secretary-General is almost never the most well-known at the outset, but often the most acceptable at the end. Profiles that are too visible, too political, or perceived as ideologically biased are generally eliminated. Conversely, discreet, experienced candidates capable of reassuring all the major powers have a decisive advantage. This is what some analysts call the "optimal gray area": a delicate balance between credibility and neutrality. This election takes place behind the scenes, with secret "straw polls," bilateral negotiations, and implicit geopolitical deals: the final vote is merely a formality!
2027 a race already mapped out : in the perspective of the 2027–2031 term, 5 international figures are positioning themselves (Costa Rica : former Vice-President, H.E. Mrs. Rebeca Grynspan, UN product and current Secretary-General of UNCTAD; Argentina: H.E. Rafael Grossi, diplomat and current Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Chile (without country support) : former President H.E. Mrs. Michelle Bachelet, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; African Union (26 contested, without country support ) former President of Senegal H.E. Mr. Macky Sall , former President of the African Union; and Argentina: H.E. Virginia Gamba , Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General.
Several trends are already shaping the competition. On the one hand, an unwritten geographical rotation would favor the American continent (and therefore Latin America). On the other hand, growing pressure is driving the nomination of a woman, a first in the history of the UN.
In this context, certain candidacies stand out. That of Her Excellency Rebeca Grynspan appears today to be the most aligned with the prevailing criteria: female, Latin American, with a technocratic profile and a relatively undivisive profile. Conversely, more politically exposed figures, such as Her Excellency Michelle Bachelet, are generating more reservations, particularly from certain major powers, and are rejected by her own country. Her Excellency Virginia Gamba, with less global experience, is also in contention.
Diplomat Rafael Grossi, for his part, represents a credible alternative, likely to emerge should there be a deadlock over the issue of women and provided he doesn't stumble on the nuclear questions related to the two high-profile wars in Ukraine and Iran. According to historical criteria, he would be the favorite over Macky Sall, a candidate with a high media and political profile and potentially considered divisive, whose geographical rotation is also a disadvantage. His chances would be strongly linked to the refusal of a woman to run for president and a serious impasse on the nuclear issue.
A divided Africa, a missed opportunity : another element deserves attention—the role of the African Union. Unlike some previous elections, the organization failed to put forward a single, unified, and consensual candidate. This fragmentation weakens the candidate, President Macky Sall, and the continent's influence in the negotiations. It also deprives Africa of an opportunity to speak with one voice to the major powers—a crucial lever in this type of process.
A disturbing but essential truth : in the end, a reality emerges, as simple as it is disconcerting, at the UN, you don't win because you are the best; you win because you are the one nobody wants to block.
This system, often criticized, nevertheless guarantees a form of stability: the Secretary-General is above all a mediator, whose legitimacy rests on his ability to engage in dialogue with everyone, including the most opposing powers.
For the general African public, understanding this mechanism is already a step towards better defending their interests in major international arenas.
What lesson and what advice for Senegal ? It is about understanding the real rules of the game and moving beyond national politics, which hinders more than it enlightens. Supporting a candidate is not enough. That candidate must also be acceptable to the five permanent members of the Security Council. In this context, an effective strategy would be to integrate oneself into the dynamics of consensus, by forging discreet alliances and anticipating the geopolitical and geostrategic balances that will influence decision-making.
Author :
Dr. Madiagne Diallo, University Professor in Decision Support and Optimization
Winner of the African Evidence Leadership Award 2020, from the African Academy of Sciences and AFIDEP Kenya.
Former Minister-Counselor in charge of South-South Cooperation, to His Excellency Abdoulaye Wade
Former Consul General of Senegal in São Paulo, Brazil
Former Deputy Secretary-General of the EESC
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