When we talk about rent-seeking, the image that immediately comes to mind is often that of oil, gas, or mineral resources. However, modern rent-seeking extends far beyond raw materials. It can arise from an exclusive license, a dominant market position, privileged access to public procurement, or even a regulatory advantage that is difficult for new entrants to obtain.

The principle remains simple. Rent corresponds to income obtained less through innovation, productivity, or risk-taking than through the possession of an economic privilege. Those who benefit from this position earn more not because they produce better, but because they control access to a scarce resource.

In several African economies, this logic extends far beyond the extractive industries. Port concessions, certain import authorizations, telecommunications licenses, recurring public procurement contracts, and even some segments of the distribution sector can operate according to this logic.

The telecommunications sector offers a clear illustration of this. Obtaining an operating license in this field grants access to a highly profitable market with significant barriers to entry. Economic value is based not only on service quality but also on the institutional scarcity of the license itself. In Senegal, Sonatel has historically held a dominant position in this market, within an environment where access remains heavily regulated.

Urban land also generates significant rents. In some capital cities like Dakar or Abidjan, owning well-located land allows for considerable gains without necessarily involving productive activity. Administrative scarcity, urban planning decisions, or privileged access to certain areas create a value that is sometimes disconnected from the actual investment.

Public procurement is another sensitive area. When a small number of players regularly secure major infrastructure, supply, or public service contracts, the line between economic performance and institutional rent-seeking sometimes becomes blurred. Profitability then depends as much on proximity to public contracts as on actual competitiveness.

Taxation itself can sometimes reinforce these mechanisms. Certain targeted exemptions, special regimes, or prolonged tariff protections can preserve established positions in the long term without always stimulating innovation.

The economic problem is not only moral, it is structural. An economy dominated by rent-seeking tends to discourage competition, slow the entry of new players, and direct investments towards the capture of privileges rather than towards the creation of productive value.

This directly impacts industrialization. Why invest in processing, research, or exports when more secure income exists in protected imports, captive distribution, or guaranteed markets?

Modern rent-seeking is not always visible in mining or oil statistics. It often lies hidden in regulatory details, vested interests, and the invisible barriers that silently shape the economy.